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In her paper about power relations between participants in argumentative 
interactions, Professor Kloster addresses an issue that is immensely important and 
relevant to the study and practice of argumentation. Imbalances of power between 
arguers often explain why argumentative exchanges go wrong and create conditions 
that are counterproductive to good argumentation. I also appreciate the normative 
approach evidenced in the aim: “to remedy improper uses of power” (p. 9). At the 
same time, Kloster’s way of approaching power from her logical view of 
argumentation is somewhat alien to my rhetorical way of thinking.  As 
commentator, let me at once add that I am not acquainted with the fields of inquiry 
and the literature that the paper refers to and proceeds from. Being in a position 
where I – to use the terminology of the paper – need to be ‘leveled up’, the 
comments have the character of questions rather that expert comments on the 
paper’s own terms. 
In the first sections of her paper, Kloster suggests that argumentation theory 
may reach valuable insights by turning to negotiation theory, which is described as 
“years ahead” of argumentation when it comes to investigating power relations 
between parties involved in the interaction (p. 2). The introduction to this line of 
inquiry on the following pages is informative and illuminative, and Kloster 
convincingly gets the message across that looking at negotiations may yield fruitful 
insights about argumentation in general. However, in the comparison between 
negotiation and argumentation I encounter a need for clarification. It strikes me the 
two terms in the comparison are not on par. Negotiation is defined as a practice or 
kind of discourse “which may include argumentation and may rely on reason”. The 
word ‘argumentation’ here must be understood as referring to a broad notion on a 
higher level of abstraction than ‘negotiation’. But if negotiation is a practice 
subsumed under argumentation, how can they at the same time be compared as two 
parallel kinds of practice? Is Kloster saying that negotiation and argumentation 
overlap? Or does she, in using the comparison, imply a certain type of argumentative 
practice? (Cf. Walton, 1992, p. 95)  It seems to me that the latter is the case and that 
the specific kind of argumentation in the comparison is indicated by the term 
“rational persuasion”. What in turn this expression refers to is indicated by the 
description of argumentation as “the practice of presenting, evaluating, and revising 
arguments with the aim of assenting only to conclusions which have been 
adequately supported” (p. 2).  
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My own paper for this conference concerns the relations and interplay 
between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic. Having this in the back of my mind while 
preparing the commentary, I was inclined to consider the paper in this perspective. 
In this connection, Kloster’s paper exemplifies the fact that investigations within 
these fields of course do not exclude integration of other research traditions, in this 
case negotiation theory and feminist studies. Apart from this, how does her paper fit 
in within the three traditional fields of argumentation? Firstly, Kloster repeatedly 
identifies herself as a logician, underscoring for instance that her purpose is not a 
question of “abandoning the standards of logical reasoning” (p. 9), referring to 
informal logic, I assume. Secondly, her paper incorporates approaches associated 
with the dialectical tradition by focusing on turn-taking communicative situations. 
Thirdly, the paper includes some elements that point in the direction of rhetoric, for 
instance the term ‘persuasion’ to identify the aim of arguing. When it comes to the 
legitimacy of persuasive appeals, the picture becomes blurred: On the one hand, 
Kloster seemingly maintains a traditional logical view that privileges rational 
appeals and reject emotional appeals; on the other hand, her proposal to make room 
for narratives in argumentative settings may be seen as an opening towards the 
acceptability of ethos and pathos.  
In this connection, I have some reservations concerning the concept of rational 
argumentation. ‘Rational persuasion’ may sound like a contradiction in terms, and it 
seems unclear whether Kloster uses the notion of rationality in a narrow or broad 
sense? At the outset of the paper, she distances herself from “rational argument” – 
or worse, “the rationalist model of […] logical reasoning” – identifying it with “a 
masculine, westernized ideal of objective reasoning” and norms and privileges 
enjoyed by especially well-educated and well-off white males (p.1). However, the 
paper on the whole leaves the reader with the impression that she carries this 
rather restricted rational norm with her in the baggage. If we understand rationality 
in the broader sense of reasonableness and rephrase the ideal of argumentation as 
‘reasonable persuasion’, this would be a significant improvement from my point of 
view (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Toulmin, 2001).  
Another question relates to theories of consensus vs. dissensus. That Kloster 
identifies with the consensus view is evidenced several times in the paper; for 
instance, she describes the goal of argumentation as “the successful resolution of a 
disagreement” (p. 6). On the other hand, the inclusion of negotiation theory presents 
a move towards the acceptability of reasonable disagreement, a move that I 
welcome.  
The final comments concern the issue of the so-called status quo fallacy. It is 
described as “power-blindness” consisting in a “comfortable ignorance, on the part 
of those who fit the current norms, of the difficulties faced by those who are 
disadvantaged.” The fallacy is committed, explains Kloster, when privileged 
communicators “assume that everyone can read, […] get a job”, etc.  This reminded 
me of the anecdote about the judge who reproached the poor, starving thief, saying: 
When I go home from work, I am hungry too, but I don’t steal! Now, is this really a 
fallacy? I agree that such examples reveal lacking social and communicative skills as 
well as empathy in general, but find that categorizing them as a fallacy is stretching 
the notion of fallacy too far.  
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I fail to see the status quo power-blindness as a fallacy because, to my way of 
thinking, this term is closely related to how one argues and should not be extended 
to one’s conceptions of who one argues with, or to other factors that surround the 
argumentative interaction. Thus, I cannot follow Kloster when she insists that they 
should be treated as “a problem in the argument itself: the use of premises which 
are either not acceptable or not sufficient to establish the conclusion.” (p. 8) 
Moreover, I cannot see how this is demonstrated in the paper. Most of the examples 
concern discourse that seeks to prepare participants to enter argumentation by 
equalizing them. Nowhere in the paper does Kloster provide examples that show 
how ignorance of power-imbalances between the parties appears in the arguments 
themselves, or that such ignorance can be used abusively in premises, which are 
unacceptable or insufficient to establish the conclusion. 
However, this objection does not mean that I am blind to the problem of 
power-blindness. Kloster is right in drawing attention to it. As I read the paper, the 
kind of discursive practice that she is concerned with is argumentation in 
educational contexts, typically problems that arise in classroom settings. In turn, the 
main point, as I understand it, is that in various situations of this educational kind 
one must face the problem that the differences in powers may be too many and too 
big for argument even to get started. In such cases one must of course do something 
to equalize power. To ignore imbalances, projecting one’s own competences and 
norms onto those who do not share them, is indeed counterproductive.  
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